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Abstract 
 
Pension reform still remains one of the major government agendas in South 
Korea, despite a series of reforms in 1998 and 2007. This paper argues that the 
unsatisfactory reforms were inevitable since those reform packages were based 
on traditional parametric reform retaining the DB (Defined Benefit) principle. 
Thus, this paper argues for a paradigm shift in designing the Korean pension 
system, which utilizes a Swedish-style NDC (Non-Financial Defined 
Contribution) earning-related pension plus a supplementary basic pension as an 
alternative model. This paper is divided into three parts. The first analyzes and 
evaluates the pension reforms concerning the financial sustainability. The 
second part discusses the current state of basic security for the elderly and 
recently introduced basic pension scheme, The third part combines the two 
reform issues and introduces a detailed framework for an NDC-based multi-tier 
pension system.  
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I. Introduction 
 
The National Pension Scheme (NPS), which covers all private sector income-
earners in South Korea, was established in 1988. Compared to the public 
pension programs of advanced welfare states in the Western World, NPS is a 
relatively young program. Nonetheless, pension reform has already become one 
of the major government agendas in Korea, due to the rapid aging of and weak 
basic security for the elderly. Indeed, the Kim Dae Jung government 
(1998~2002) made the first reform to the NPS in 1998, ten years after its 
introduction. Nine years later, the Roh Moo Hyun government (2003~2007) 
made another pension reform in 2007. However, unsatisfactory reforms to the 
pension problems have sparked continuous national political debate since their 
introduction. Why did the series of reforms fall short of expectations? 
This paper argues that the unsatisfactory reforms were inevitable since those 
reform packages were based on traditional parametric reform retaining the DB 
(Defined Benefit) principle. Thus, I argue for a paradigm shift in designing the 
Korean pension system, which utilizes a Swedish-style NDC (Non-Financial 
Defined Contribution) earning-related pension plus a supplementary basic 
pension as an alternative model.  
This paper is divided into three parts. The first analyzes and evaluates the 
hitherto implemented reforms concerning the financial sustainability of the 
Korean pension system and suggests an alternative paradigm. The second part 
discusses proposals concerning basic security, which are inadequately 
addressed in the current security system. The third part combines the two 
reform issues and introduces a detailed framework for an NDC-based multi-tier 
pension system.  
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II. Two Major Pension Reform Issues: Sustainability and 
Basic Security 
 
1. Financial Sustainability 
 
1) Need for Reform and Government Response 
The main reason Korea is pursuing pension reform stems from its rapidly 
aging population. In 2000, Korea reported 7.1% of its population as elderly, 
entering the ‘aging society’. In 2018, Korea is expected to become an ‘aged 
society’ with an elderly population of 14.3%, and will be facing a full-scale 
‘super-aged society’ in 2026 with an elderly population of 20.8% (Chung, 2005: 
71-72). This rapid aging implies that Korea would suffer from a shocking rise in 
social expenditures, especially pension costs.  
Well aware of the financial unsustainability of the NPS, the Korean 
government sought to stabilize finances through gradual parametric reforms, 
emphasizing more pre-funding. In 1998, the Kim Dae Jung government reduced 
the income replacement rate from 70 to 60 percent, raised premiums gradually 
from 6 to 9 percent, and increased the pensionable age from 60 to 65. This 
reform made the NPS healthier, but the structural financial unsustainability 
remained the same, and the reform only delayed the pension fund depletion until 
2047.  
Therefore, the pension reform issue was soon put back on the table, and 
another parametric reform was made in 2007. The key feature of the reform 
was to reduce the income replacement rate to 50 percent in 2008 and 
eventually to 40 percent in 2028, without raising the contribution rate from the 
present 9 percent. This reform postpones the fund depletion to about 2060 
(Figure 1). This reform is a political achievement for the Roh Moo Hyun 
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government in that the government made a successful pension reform 
preemptively, 40 years ahead of the expected pension fund depletion.  
 
Figure 1. Pension Fund before and after 2007 reform (Percent of GDP) 
 
Source: Moon (2007). 
 
2) Evaluation of the 2007 pension reform  
Two concerns could be raised over the 2007 reform. First, the target 
replacement rate of 40 percent, which is based on average life-time earning for 
40 years, is too low for effective insurance against longevity risk. It is argued 
that, after the year 2028 when the replacement rate will be finally reduced to 
40 percent, not only the NPS, but also corporate pension and private pension 
savings are expected to reach mature levels. Therefore, lowering the income 
replacement rate to 40% is not a large problem (The Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, 2006; Yoon, Kim, and Shin, 2005). I agree that corporate pension and 
private pension savings will increase old-age income. However, adequacy does 
not necessarily guarantee protection against future risk associate with longevity, 
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simply because private pension assets left over by the shorter-lived can be 
hardly used for the longer-lived. Income transfer between pensioners is by 
definition impossible in those private pension schemes. Therefore, a public 
pension scheme like the NPS should be large enough to have an effective 
insurance function against longevity risk. Unfortunately, the NPS’s 40% 
replacement rate is too small to have the insurance function.  
Second, the financial stabilization measures are still insufficient. First of all, in 
order to guarantee 40 percent income replacement, an insurance premium of at 
least 11.85 percent is needed, according to the conservative projection by the 
government itself.1 Therefore, it is clear that the government’s promise of 40 
percent income replacement while maintaining the contribution rate at 9 percent 
is a financially unthinkable promise, whilst understandable from a political point 
of view. Also, it should be pointed out that, if the government continues to rely 
on a Defined Benefit (DB) system, the government will still have to repeat 
parametric reforms that involve raising premiums and reducing the income 
replacement ratio as life expectancy continues to increase. In short, promising 
40% income replacement with a premium of 9% is once again a ‘promise they 
cannot keep’ and is merely aggravating the lack of trust in the NPS.  
 
3) Need for a Paradigm Shift toward NDC 
Then, is there any alternative that can ensure long-term financial 
sustainability and insurance for longevity? The first necessary step is to 
introduce the Defined Contribution (DC) principle. One could argue that it is not 
necessarily required to convert the traditional DB scheme to a DC scheme, 
since full prefunding is possible even under the DB scheme only if the 
government has the ‘political will’ to increase the contribution rate and reduce 
 
1 Moreover, the author’s calculation notes that in order to guarantee a 40% income 
substitution, insurance premiums must rise to at least 13.0-13.6 percent given the 
magnitude of aging. 
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pension payouts by lowering the income replacement rate or raising the 
pensionable age. Even if we suppose such reform is politically feasible, 2  
accurate long-term financial estimation for prefunding is technically impossible 
(Palmer, 2006:15; Kim and Kim 2006:27-29). Under the DB system, the 
government have to consider at least the next 60 years and be able to 
accurately predict the exact average lifespan of all those insured in order to 
levy actuarially correct premiums and promise a certain income replacement 
rate. In addition, it is necessary to precisely calculate the economic growth 
rate, commodity price increases, and all other factors influencing the pension 
formula.  
There is a plausible attempt to achieve long-term financial sustainability 
under the DB system. Germany and Japan, for example, introduced a so-called 
‘sustainability factor’ which automatically reduces pension payments according 
to the increase in life expectancy (Börsch-Supan and Wilke, 2006). One of the 
merits of such an ‘automatic adjustment’ is to make payment reductions a non-
political issue. However, the practical problem of achieving a long term 
estimate still remains the same since the automatic adjustment mechanism 
works only after financial equilibrium is secured. Moreover, it is very difficult 
set up a ‘near perfect’ formula for a sustainability factor. Therefore, it is likely 
that more citizens than under a DC system will not accept the decrease in 
pension benefit following the pace of ageing. Thus, politicians would be more 
tempted to intervene in setting up a sustainability factor in favor of current 
pensioners at the sacrifice of future generations.  
 
 
2 In reality, such political will tends not to be implemented since “blame avoidance” is a 
typical problem in politics (Weaver, 1986). No matter how accurate the long term 
actuarial projection, it is historic fact that, the right time for necessary adjustments 
of insurance premiums and pension is missed, because of political problems. 
Consequently, aiming to accumulate reserves through endless parametric reforms is 
difficult to achieve in reality,  
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Thus, the only way to secure the pension system’s long-term sustainability is 
to introduce a DC plan to determine the pension amount at the time of 
retirement by dividing the pension asset accumulated during working life by the 
remaining life expectancy. The DC plan has two main variants, the Chilean 
Financial Defined Contribution plan (FDC) and the Swedish Non-financial 
Defined Contribution (NDC). The author strongly suggests employing the NDC 
plan, because a publicly managed Swedish-style NDC scheme has a superior 
insurance function against longevity risk compared to the privately managed 
Chilean-style FDC program that might better serve as a savings function. In 
addition, conversion to a FDC model risks high transition costs.3 Even though 
Korea has tried to secure pre-funding, the NPS’ hidden debt reached W 286 
trillion (approximately $ 286 billion) and it is estimated to increase to W 458 
trillion (approximately $ 458 billion) in 2010. This means that transition costs 
would be preventively as high as 50% of the GDP (Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, 2006).  
The NDC scheme may be criticized for its vulnerability to demographic 
change since it is a pay-as-you-go system. This criticism, however, could be 
averted by indexing the interest rate relative to the growth rate of the sum of 
covered earnings (or the contribution base), not to the growth rate of per capita 
income. This is because the government’s ability to pay pensions depends on 
the size of its total contribution base, not on per capita income. In order to 
maintain financial stability, the interest rate should be set in line with the rate of 
decline, not to mention the increase in the contribution base. The same 
 
3 In the case of adopting an obligatory FDC plan, working generations will be made to 
pay premiums not to the government, but to a private pension company that will 
accumulate interest to build an individual insured’s pension asset. In this case, the 
government, unable to collect premiums but still obligated to pay out the promised 
payment to the surviving pension beneficiaries, faces having to raise taxes or reduce 
budget expenditures in other areas. In the end, a change from a traditional public 
pension scheme to an FDC plan means that the working generations become 
responsible for both their own pensions and those of the elderly at the same time. 
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principles should be applied to pension payouts. The pension benefit should be 
automatically linked not only to the inflation rate, but also to the real fluctuation 
rate of the contribution base. These methods will serve to achieve financial 
balance and make pensioners share the fluctuation of the working generation’s 
living standard.4  
As such, the NDC-based public pension scheme is better at securing financial 
sustainability and security for longevity risk than such pension schemes as 
traditional DB and Chilean FDC plans. It is time to seriously consider a paradigm 
shift rather than endless makeshift patchworks. Under the NDC principle, the 
earning-related old age system is set up as a pure insurance system. Thus, a 
redistributive basic security system should be built along with the NDC scheme.  
 
2. Basic Security  
 
1) Need for Reform and Government Response 
As of 2005, among senior citizens aged 65 or over, beneficiaries of the NPS 
accounted for as little as 13.5% (Ministry of Health and Welfare, 2006:4). From 
2008, when the national pension marked its 20th year in operation, the number 
of beneficiaries will increase, leading to gains in retirement income security 
ratio. However, even after 2030, the national pension grant rate is expected to 
 
4 In addition, for actuarial balance, spouse’ rights to pension assets should be deferred. 
In order to guarantee the pension payments to beneficiaries who live beyond the 
average expected life span, the leftover pension assets of beneficiaries who live 
shorter than expected should be transferred to the longer-living beneficiaries. This 
method causes the problem that wives, especially non-working wives, may suffer 
from not being guaranteed income by inevitable suspension of further pension 
support to the surviving dependants. This problem should be resolved via tax-based 
income support by the state, expansion of women’s participation in economic 
activities, and facilitation of securing pension assets in the periods of child birth and 
rearing with no real income.  
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still hover around the 60% range. Moreover, the number of recipients whose 
benefits are below the minimum cost of living is expected to be sizable. 
According to Yong-ha Kim (2005), the "effective" number of the poor elderly, 
which combines non-beneficiaries with those receiving benefits below the 
minimum living cost, is projected to take up as much as 47 to 50 percent of the 
total elderly population even after 2040, when the NPS will mature. There are 
several reasons for this.   
First of all, there is a huge contribution evasion by the self-employed who 
account for more than 25 percent of the economically active population. Second, 
after neoliberal labor market reforms, an increasing number of workers fall into 
the working poor, who are reluctant to pay even a small contribution and have a 
short contribution period. To protect the vulnerable, the so-called A value 
(redistributive mechanism) is built into the NPS, so that poor pensioners can 
receive a higher benefit than the actuarial balance sheet. This redistributive 
mechanism, however, cannot significantly reduce old-age poverty, since 
minimum guarantee is not provided. As a substitution, the National Basic 
Livelihood Security system, a public assistance program in Korea, addresses 
the problem. However, the existing public assistance scheme is criticized for its 
incapacity to tackle old-age poverty due to strict entitlement criteria.  
Against this backdrop, the Roh Moo Hyun government introduced a tax-
financed near-universal basic pension system called "Basic Old-age Pension 
Scheme" (BOAPS) in 2007. This provides the lower 60 percent of all senior 
citizens with up to W 83,000 a month (approximately $ 83, which is 5 percent of 
the average income of the NPS contributors). The government promised to 
increase the payouts gradually up to 10 percent of the average income of the 
NPS insured, and extend the coverage up to 70 percent of all the elderly in 
2009. The government allotted W 2.23 trillion (approximately $ 2.23 billion) to 
basic old-age pension in 2008 and the spending is expected to go up to W 3.41 
trillion (approximately $ 3.41 billion) in 2009 (Ko, 2007). 
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2) Evaluation of the basic old-age pension system  
It would be undisputedly desirable if basic livelihood for the entire elderly 
population can be secured under the universal basic pension. However, we 
observe that a non-contributory fixed amount basic pension scheme incurs new 
financial issues in an aging society. Thus it is expected that the real amount of 
basic pension benefits will continue to decrease as the number of elderly 
increases.  
In this regard, it would not be unfair to expect that the BOAPS will not be 
effective in securing a livelihood for the low-income elderly. Given the steep 
aging trend in Korea, the near-universal basic pension scheme is no longer 
financially sustainable. It is easy to expect that the basic security level will end 
up with a low equilibrium despite government’s massive financial injection 
following the skyrocketing population of the elderly. As a result, those who 
have nothing but the basic pension to depend on, will receive only a small 
amount of benefit, insufficient to break away from poverty.  
What’s worse, this problem will be aggravated if NDC-based structural 
reform is not made to the financially unsustainable NPS, let alone other special 
public pension schemes for government employees, military personnel, and 
teachers, which are already in deficit. The Korean government will have no 
choice but to place priority on meeting the pension promise for the public 
scheme because it is an earned entitlement. Under this financial constraint, the 
government could not afford to spare enough amount of the budget for the non-
contributory BOAPS. It would not be unfair to say that the fate of the system is 
to deteriorate into a useless basic pension scheme.  
 
3) Need for a Paradigm Shift toward a Supplementary Guarantee Pension 
In a (hyper) aged society with the elderly taking up a third of the population, 
the basic pension system should be designed to be financially efficient so that 
the minimum basic security line can be set at a higher level. In this regard, a 
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‘supplementary’ minimum income security system deserves serious 
consideration. Depending on what is to be secured, the system can be divided 
into two types, a minimum income security and a minimum pension security 
system. The former, guaranteeing a certain level of income, is used in the UK, 
Canada, and Austria, while the latter guarantees a certain level of pension in 
Sweden and France (Hong, 2006). Both are supplementary schemes with high 
financial efficiency in principle, so they are appropriate models for an aged 
society. A key difference between the two systems is whether a means-test is 
applied. The supplementary minimum income security scheme applies a means-
test, while the former system usually requires a pension-test only regardless of 
the pensioner’s other income and wealth.  
In the Korean situation, characterized by a large number of self-employed 
and irregular workers in the informal sector, a guaranteed minimum income 
system is more appropriate unless the state taxing capacity is improved. In the 
Korean case, I  suggest to separate the current national basic livelihood 
security system into two schemes on the basis of age, one for working age 
groups and the other for those over 65. The latter group is the target of what 
would be called a ‘Guarantee Pension’. This would guarantee basic livelihood by 
government payments in the same way that the current national basic livelihood 
security system does. However, unlike working age people, this guarantee 
pension will require a less strict means-test.  
 
III. Synthesis and Basic Framework  
 
1. Basic Framework for a New Pension System Design 
 
The two major issues of the Korean pension system are not independent from 
each other. If the earning-related pension scheme is large enough (that is, if the 
income replacement rate is high enough), then the number of beneficiaries on 
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supplementary basic pension would be lowered. On the contrary, if the basic 
pension guarantees a high level of security, then it would lower work incentive 
and induce people to evade contribution to the earning-related pension scheme; 
this is especially true of those near the minimum guarantee line. More 
fundamentally, in an aging society, it would be difficult to secure enough 
financial resources for the low-income elderly unless sustainability of the 
earning-related pension scheme is achieved. Therefore, the first step for the 
solution to the interrelated issues is to secure financial sustainability of the 
second tier earning-related pension. An NDC scheme will satisfy the first step. 
The second step is to make the NDC scheme large enough to effectively fulfill 
its insurance and savings functions. This will also lower the number of people 
on the supplementary basic pension (Guarantee Pension). The third step is to 
set a minimum security line greater than a universal basic pension allowance, 
but at the sustainable level. Finally, the last step would be to cultivate private 
pensions at the third tier. These steps could be drawn as shown below.    
 
Figure 2. A New NDC-based Model for the Korean Pension System  
Source: Yang (2006) 
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2. Designing the Second Tier: NDC Earning-related Pension Scheme 
 
1) Target Income Replacement Rate and Necessary Contribution Rate 
The NDC pension’s income replacement rate is determined by pensioner’s 
choice. Those who work longer and retire later in their life span would enjoy 
high income replacement. However, the overall income replacement rate 
depends on the contribution rate set by the government. In order for average 
income earners who work for 40 years to secure adequate old-age pension 
benefits, this paper proposes a target income replacement rate of 50 percent of 
averaged life-time income. Then, according to my calculation, the necessary 
contribution rate should be at least 17.5 percent. 5  Given that the average 
contribution rate in most OECD countries is around 20 percent, 17.5 percent 
seems tolerable.  
In Korea, however, employers’ burden is higher than it seems, since either 
severance payment or corporate pension is mandatory, which are funded solely 
by employers. For either program, the employer’s burden is equal to 8.33 
percent of the employee’s salary. Taken together, the actual contribution rate 
will amount to 25.8 percent (17.5% + 8.33%). Thus, I propose a comprehensive 
conversion of severance payment into the NDC scheme and into corporate 
pensions: 4% into the NDC scheme and the remaining 4.33% into the corporate 
pension based on the FDC principle. Then, the actual increase in contribution 
rate is as low as 4.5 percentage points, which is quite acceptable. Finally, the 
4.5 percent can be evenly split between employers and employees, which 
further lightens employees’ burden (Yang, 2006).  
 
 
5 In the calculation formulae, life expectancy was assumed to increase 0.6 percent 
annually, the GDP was set as 2.87% in real term, personal income peaked at 55 and 
then decreased 2.5 percent annually, and the NDC interest rate was set at 2.5% in 
real term.    
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2) Annuity calculation, Automatic Adjustment, and Work Incentive  
 
Table 1. Income Replacement Rates by Retirement Age (W, % of lifetime 
earning) 
Retirement Age 65 66 67 68 69 70 
Life Expectancy 21.74 20.77 19.83 18.92 18.00 17.12 
Annuity(month) 1101.655 1210.057 1327.842 1455.887 1598.692 1753.801 
Replacement Rate 50.06 54.98 60.33 66.15 72.64 79.69 
Note: The individual’s earnings are assumed to grow at a real rate of 2.5% per annum 
throughout the earning career up to age 55, and then decrease at the same rate.  
Source: Yang (2006) 
 
In this new DC system, the insured can claim pension annuity at any time over 
age 65. The annuity is calculated by dividing the capital balance at the chosen 
time of retirement by the average (unisex) life expectancy for a claimer of that 
specific age. The capital balance consists of contributions during the working 
years plus the interest indexed to the rate of growth of the sum of covered 
earnings (or contribution base). The financial instability created by aging is 
counteracted automatically by a change in the life expectancy factor, which 
actually means decreasing benefits for pensioners. The new system is by 
nature actuarial. Thus, the new system signals that the individual should handle 
the automatically reduced annuity by working longer, contributing more, or by 
postponing his/her annuity claim.  
Furthermore, as shown in Table 1 above, the pension benefit could increase 
as people work longer and retire later, because longer working years means a 
higher pension asset and retiring later shortens the payment period. This 
transparent link between retirement age and benefit level puts the spotlight on 
work and the rewards associated with a longer working life. With the prospects 
of rapidly declining numbers in the workforce due to the low fertility rate in 
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Korea, one of the merits the proposed NDC pension scheme delivers is to help 
increase the age at which individuals leave the workforce as improvements in 
health and longevity continue.       
 
3. Designing the First Tier: Guarantee Pension 
 
1) Target beneficiaries and Means-testing 
The target group of the supplementary Guarantee Pension are NDC 
pensioners whose income is below the National Minimum. In order to benefit 
from the Guarantee Pension, individuals should pass a means test. The means 
tested income consists of the sum of pension benefits from the NDC and FDC 
corporate pensions, and other sources of income, e.g., rent, savings, and private 
transfer. Unlike the working age beneficiaries of the public assistance program, 
nonfinancial assets such as a house are excluded in the means-test. The 
amount of guarantee pension benefit is dependent on the gap between the 
National Minimum and the individual’s earnings.  
 
2) Guarantee Level and Financial Efficiency 
The National Minimum will be set slightly higher than the current level of 
minimum livelihood; for single person households, 15% of the average 
household income, and for married couples, 25%. These targets are much 
higher than the current BOAPS’ target of 10%. Nevertheless, the financial 
efficiency is far greater than that of the basic pension based on a “social 
allowance.” Three projections are made.  
As seen in Figure 3, the expected result of the budget size for the 
supplementary scheme without considering NDC pension income continuously 
increases from W 4.7 trillion in 2010 to W 117.5 trillion in 2050 (See Basic 
Income Security I). However, when income from the NDC earning-related 
pension is included, the budget size continues to grow, but at a slower pace 
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from W 4.5 trillion in 2010 to W 52.7 trillion in 2050 (See Basic Income Security 
II). For the latter, the financial burden is only 1/14 of the universal Basic 
Pension scheme based on a ‘social allowance’, which provides 10% of 
household income on a fixed term (Yang and Hong, 2006).  
 
Figure 3. GDP Comparison of Three Types of Basic Pension 
 
Source: Yang and Hong (2006) 
 
In spite that the guaranteed payout level is greater than that of the basic 
pension system, the Guarantee Pension requires less financial resources in 
absolute terms. Figure 1 also shows that the pace of increase in the required 
amount is steady due to income from a relatively large NDC scheme. Therefore, 
the total national financial burden is expected to be lightened.  
 
IV. Conclusion  
 
In Korea, it is often argued that the NDC system would be appropriate only 
when the transition cost is enormous due to maturity in the NPS system. 
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However, there is no logical reason to delay system transition on such a 
premise. If there is a reason to delay transition, it would be a political one. 
Establishment of a multi-tier pension system based on the NDC earning-related 
pension will invite political backlash from the vested interest, as they could not 
enjoy their privilege any more. Postponing reform, however, is not the right 
decision at a time when we have to confront unavoidable challenges. 
The NDC-based multi-tier pension system might not be a perfect model. 
However, when it comes to economy and social welfare, the NDC-based model 
also has comparative advantages over any other traditional DB and new FDC 
plans. I look forward to a more active academic discussion about the NDC-
based pension system suitable and feasible for the current Korean retirement 
situation.  
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